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Abstract. 
We showhow disasters influence subjective political trust by testing the 
effect of the 2011 Great East Japan. For this test, we used the individual level data 
of 7 Asian countries including Japan covering the period before and after the disaster. 
The key findings are: the disaster led to sharp drops in trust of the national 
government, trust in the Prime Minister, trust in political parties, and trust in the 
parliament.  However, we do not find a loss of support in local governments.   
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1. Introduction 
 
When disaster strikes, we usually here of people from near and far coming 
to help the victims.  People come to each others' assistance in rebuilding their 
homes and their lives.  There may be short bursts of increased trust in other people.  
Does this also apply to confidence in government? 
We don't see long-term increases in trust in others, since this form of trust—
"generalized trust"—is learned early in life and does not change much over people's 
lives (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 6).  How do disasters shape trust in government? 
Disasters and other crises may lead to more bonding among people.  
Aldrich (2011) finds that social ties among residents were the central factor in 
helping people recover from the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan.  Putnam (2002) 
argues that all sorts of measures of “social capital” or cohesion increased 
dramatically after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and 
other targets.  Americans became more trusting of most government institutions 
(especially the military) and of each other–and also were more likely to take part in 
community organizations and especially to donate to charitable causes. 
The 9/11 attacks in the United States led to "us against them" sentiments in 
the United States. Natural disasters are different.  People are more likely to blame 
government for not doing enough to prevent—or to mitigate—the disaster.  And this 
is especially likely to be the case if people believe that government officials could 
have done more to limit the extent of damages, but were too closely linked to private 
interests that had financial interests that would have been hurt if they had taken 
strong steps to mitigate damages. 
Trust in government is based to a considerable extent on people's 
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expectations of how well government performs (Hetherington, 2006).  Specifically, 
government must deliver basic services to warrant people's trust (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2002; Uslaner, 2011).  In the face of a natural disaster, expectations are 
high.  People cannot cope with the trauma of rebuilding their lives without 
assistance. If government agencies are able to steer a recovery and to restore essential 
services, people will have confidence in their leaders. When government fails, trust 
in political institutions will fall—especially when people believe that their leaders 
could have done better—and even more if they believe that the leaders may have 
played some role in making the impact of the disaster worse than it might have been. 
This is what we observe in our analysis of trust in government in Japan after 
the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.  Using data from the East Asia 
Barometer before and after the disaster, we find sharp drops in trust the national 
government, trust in the Prime Minister, trust in political parties, and trust in the 
parliament.  We do not find a loss of support in local governments.  Local 
governments could not readily be blamed for the failure to minimize damages and 
they help people reestablish their lives after the disaster. 
 
2. Overview of the Great East Japan Earthquake 
On March 11, 2011, a devastating earthquake in Japan caused a tsunami. The 
Great East Japan Earthquake is regarded as one of the most catastrophic events in 
human history. Its magnitude was estimated to be 9.0 (Daily Yomiuri 2011a), which 
was the fourth largest recorded earthquake in history. The earthquake triggered a  
tsunami with a maximum height of more than 20 meters (65 feet).  It devastated 
Japan’s northeast coast and shut down the cooling systems and backup generators 
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at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant (Daily Yomiuri 2011b).1  Almost 
16,000 people died from the tsunami and 2,600 disappeared.  More than   400,000 
residents were forced to evacuate (National Police Agency of Japan 2014).  
The disaster led to massive disruptions in people's lives, but people were able to 
band together to help each other rebuild without any lawlessness (Aldrich and 
Sawada 2015; Ono 2012)2.  While we expect to see a loss of trust in all national 
institutions, including political parties, the long dominant Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) increased subsidies to local governments.  This allowed local government 
officials to increase the number of disaster preparation measures. Supporters of the 
LDP may have received greater public investments in reliable infrastructure as a 
disaster prevention measure. Aldrich and Sawada (2015) examined whether local 
support for the long dominant Liberal Democratic Party affects mortality rates of 
the Great East Japan Earthquake. Yet, the degree of supporting LDP did not 
contribute to reduce the mortality rate (Aldrich and Sawada 2015).  
The reaction to the role of the national government was strongly negative..3   
Kingston (2012, 188, 191-192) argues: 
[T]he fiercely politics of the complex Tohoku Catastrophe has slowed action 
                                                 
1 According to Tanikawa et al. (2014), the material loss of building and road infrastructure was 
estimated to be 31.8 and 2.1 million tons, respectively. The “World Bank and Japanese 
government say that there’s somewhere between $122 billion and $235 billion worth of damage 
to clean up” (Hammer 2011:28). 
2 Social ties played a critical role in the recovery from the disaster (Aldrich 2012; Toya and 
Skidmore 2014; Yamamura et al., 2015; Yamamura 2010 and 2016). 
3 Natural disaster caused government sector to be more corrupted (Yamamura 2014). 
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on recovery and discredited politicians of all political stripe. The public views 
Diet members with growing contempt because too many politicians seem to 
have prioritized pretty party politics over reconstruction…the Diet devoted 
its energy to a no-confidence motion to oust Prime Minister…Naturally, the 
public was dismayed by this unproductive vendetta at a time when the nation 
was looking for substantial emergency measures…The government was slow 
in taking measures to prevent contamination of the nation’s food supply… 
parents of children are also incensed that the government has not done more 
to deal with radiation affecting schoolyards while there are broader anxieties 
that many hot zones lay beyond the 20 km evacuation zone. 
There were charges that the natural disaster showed the national government to 
be corrupt (Yamamura 2014). Immediately after the Great East Japan earthquake 
occurred, the national government could not provide citizens reliable information 
about the disaster although local governments could do to a certain extent (Tauchi 
2015, 82). The local government of Fukushima did not receive information about the 
nuclear accident from the national government—and this hampered its ability to 
help its constituents (Tauchi 2015, 91). Without information from the national 
government, ordinary people had to rely upon themselves (Tauchi 2015, 97). 
 The government had a system for assessing where winds would carry 
radiation, but this information was not made public during the initial days after the 
meltdowns and subsequent explosions spewed radiation into the air. Consequently, 
many residents and evacuees were exposed to radioactive contamination since they 
were not given the information (New York Times, August 8, 2011). The effects of this 
lack of information led many Japanese people to disapprove of the government and 
politicians. According to Samuels (2013, 158), “In an August 2011survey, nearly 60 
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percent identified the central government as the least reliable source of information 
after a disaster --- up more than 22 percent from a survey taken before 3.11---and 
more than one-fifth identified prefectures and municipalities as the most reliable 
sources of disaster information.” 
The Japanese people seemed to distrust the central government and politicians 
after the disaster (Tauchi 2015, 97). Samuels (2013, 158) adds: “Post-3.11 
dissatisfaction with the central government was palpable and widespread at the 
local level, and local officials were the immediate beneficiaries.”  
 
 
3 Data and Hypothesis 
3.1 Data 
Our data come from the East Asia Barometer data (Hereafter, EAB data) which 
has been collected by the Program for East Asia Democratic Studies (EADS) under 
the framework of the Research Institute at National Taiwan University. We use the 
second and third waves, conducted in 2005-2008 and 2010-2012.  The EAB is based 
on national probability samples with face to face interviews. The samples were 
stratified or weighted with the aim of ensuring correct coverage of rural areas and 
minority populations. It has measures of trust in government and officials and is 
thus better suited for our analysis than the World Values Survey or the International 
Social Survey Program. 
Our key concern is whether trust in government declined in Japan after the 
earthquake and tsunami.  The second wave of EAB was conducted before the Great 
East Japan earthquakes for 18 countries. The third wave was conducted after the 
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disaster for seven countries.5  The countries covered in both waves are Japan, Hong 
Kong, Mainland China, South Korea, Malaysia, Cambodia and Indonesia In Table 1 
we present the composition of the samples. The sample sizes are 6,088 and 8,800 for 
the second and third waves, respectively.6  In Table 2 we present the variables used 
in this paper, as well as their mean values and standard deviations. There are five 
different measures of political trust: Trust in national government, prime minister 
or president, political party, parliament, and local government. Their mean values 
are slightly larger than 2.5 on the four point scale. The higher the value, the more 
people trust. 
We see substantial drops in trust for the national government, the Prime 
Minister, political parties, and parliament in Japan (see Table 3), but not for local 
governments.  Nor do we see such precipitous declines in the other countries 
covered in the third wave.  However, between 2004 and 2012,  natural disasters 
                                                 
5 EBA of the third wave has been conducted for 13 countries. However, among them, it 
has been done in 2010 which is prior to the disaster. So, countries where the survey has 
been conducted after the disaster reduced to 7. The timing of the survey was November 
2011 (Japan), September-November 2012(Hong Kong), July-October 2011(Mainland 
Chian), May 2011(Korea) October-November 2011 (Malaysia), February-March 
2012(Cambodia) and May 2011 (Indonesia). 
6 The original sample consisted of 22,288 observations for 7 countries by integrating the second 
and third waves of the EAB. However, data regarding the key variables were not available for 
all respondents. Hence, the sample size used in the estimation reduced. According to variations 
of response rate for  the dependent variables, sample sizes differacross  estimations. 1The 
sample size for trust in the national government is 4,888  in column (1) of Table 4. 
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frequently occurred in Indonesia. Hence, Indonesia is not considered as the 
appropriate non-damaged country. Then, we will examine whether sample of 
Indonesia changes the estimation results.  
Trust Prime Minister is not available for Mainland China. Negative values 
indicate declines in political trust. With the exception of Japan, Hong Kong and 
Indonesia, we see small to considerable increases in political trust.   This provides 
preliminary evidenced that disasters led to decreased political trust in Japan and 
Indonesia. However, large natural disasters occurred in Indonesia before and after 
the Japan earthquake. While we see a decline in political trust in Hong Kong, even 
as there was not a natural disaster there.  The declines in Trust National 
Government, Trust Prime Minister and Trust Political Parties are considerably 
larger in Japan than in Hong Kong and Indonesia. For Trust Parliament, the 
declines are similar for Japan, Hong Kong and Indonesia. Trust in Local Government 
declined marginally in Hong Kong and Indonesia but increased in Japan. The degree 
of decrease in political trust is larger in Japan than Hong Kong and Indonesia. 
However, from Table 3, we cannot know whether reduction of Japanese people’s 
political trust is statistically larger or smaller than other countries.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to more closely examine it using the regression analysis in the following 
sections. 
 
3.2 Method 
We use the difference-in-difference method to compare the residents in 
Japan with the residents residing in other countries (Yamamura et al., 2015). The 
estimated function takes the following form: 
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Trust itc =α0 + α1 Post Disaster Dummy it  Damaged Dummy ic  + α2 Post Disaster 
Dummy it + α3 Damaged Dummy ic + X itc B + kc + u itc, 
 
where Trust itc represents the dependent variable in individual i, period t, and 
country c. kc represents time-invariant country specific fixed effects, which captures 
unmeasured variables including weather, national culture, historical and 
institutional factors, among others. Country dummies are included as fixed effects.  
The regression parameters are denoted by α. X is the vector of the individual-level 
control variables, which capture the influence of the various respondents’ individual 
characteristics, such as age, gender, residential area, income level, education 
level,and marital status. Its vector of the regression parameters is denoted as B. The 
error term is denoted by u.  
The difference in difference (DID) model is used for the estimation with the aim 
of assessing the impact of the disaster (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 233-241). We 
investigate the differential effect of a treatment on a ‘treatment group (the country 
the disaster hit)’ versus a ‘control group (the country the disaster did not hit)’. The 
method enables us to calculates the effect of a treatment (the disaster) on an outcome 
(by comparing) by comparing the average change over time in the outcome variable 
for the treatment group, compared to the average change over time for the control 
group. The Great East Japan earthquake and the resulting tsunami and the 
Fukushima nuclear accident are exogenous events and so endogeneity bias is 
unlikely to exist. Therefore, analyzing the effect of the Great East Japan earthquake 
by the DID method can be regarded as the natural experiment.  
Post Disaster Dummy takes 1 when observations are collected after the disaster, 
otherwise 0. Damaged Dummy takes 1 when sample is gathered in Japan, otherwise 
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0. The interaction term between them (Post Disaster Dummy  Damaged Dummy) 
is a key variable for our estimation of the the disaster on political trust since it takes 
on the value of 1 only for Japanese respondents after the disaster. The coefficient of 
the interaction term will be negative if the disaster decreases political trust of 
Japanese respondents. 
 
4. Results 
Tables 4-7 report the estimates obtained from the DID method based on the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. In each table, the dependent variable is 
Trust National Government, Trust Prime Minister, Trust Political Party, Trust 
Parliament, and Trust Local Government in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), 
respectively. Table 4 presents the results based on the full-sample consisted of 7 
countries. We noted that large natural disasters frequently hit Indonesia before and 
after the Japan disaster. Therefore, Indonesia cannot be appropriately treated as the 
‘control group’ and so observations from Indonesia should be deleted from the sample. 
Hence, Table 5 show the results based on the sample of 6 countries, which does not 
include sample of Indonesia.   The decline in political trust in Japan, Hong Kong 
and Indonesia. For a robustness check about the impact of the disaster, it is valuable 
of conducting examination using subsample of Japan and Hong Kong. Further, the 
nuclear accident jointly occurred in the Japan disaster whereas the accident did not 
occur in Indonesia. Estimation based on subsample of Japan and Indonesia provide 
the evidence about how the nuclear accident influenced the political trust.  
We see from Table 4 that the key variable, Post Disaster Dummy  Damaged 
Dummy, produced negative signs and its effects are significant at the 1 % level in 
columns (1)-(4). The disaster reduced the trust in national government, prime 
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minister, political parties, and parliament. This is consistent with our prediction. 
The disaster reduced Trust National Government and Trust Prime Minister by 0.23 
and 0.22 points respectively, on the 4 point scale in compared with other Asian 
countries. The disaster reduced Trust Political Party and Trust Parliament in Japan 
by 0.19 and 0.09 points in compared with other countries. The effects of the disaster 
on Trust National Government, Trust Prime Minister and Trust Political Party are 
over 2 times larger than that on Trust Parliament. We see from column (5) that Post 
Disaster Dummy  Damaged Dummy has apositive sign but is not tistically 
significant. As shown in Table 5, after excluding observations from Indonesia, the 
estimation results about Post Disaster Dummy  Damaged Dummy are almost the 
same as those in Table 4.  
We now turn to Table 6. There are significant negative sing of the Post 
Disaster Dummy  Damaged Dummy for trust in the national government, trust in 
the Prime Minister, and trust in political parties—but not for trust in parliament 
and local government. The effect of the disaster on political trust in Japan is large  
when compared to Hong Kong. The coefficient of the Post Disaster Dummy  
Damaged Dummy (Table 7) is negative (and significant)  for trust in the national 
government, trust in the Prime Minister, and trust in political parties. The 
coefficient is positive for trust in parliament and local government and it is 
statistically significant for trust in local government.  The nuclear accident led to 
lower levels of trust in national institutions.  Local governments were strongly 
connected to the rescue effort, confidence in local institutions rose.  
As a whole, the results of Table 5 -7 are similar to those in Table 4.  
Therefore, the Great East Japan earthquake reduce the political trust regardless of 
the control groups. This can be interpreted to the nuclear accident triggered by the 
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earthquake has the critical impact on political trust because the disaster in 
Indonesia were not accompanied with the nuclear accident. All in all, considering 
Tables 5-7 jointly suggests that the estimation results of Table 4 are robust. As is 
observed in previous works (e.g., Luechinger, & Saschkly2009; Yamamura et al. 
2015), disasters influenced the subjective perception, which should be taken into 
account for analysis of impact of disaster on society. 
 
4. Conclusion. 
 
 Trust in national political institutions fell in Japan following the earthquake 
and tsunami because the Japanese people felt that the government was not 
responsive to their needs.  In 2014, 100,000 residents of the affected area remained 
dislocated. ¥3.28 trillion in funding for roads, bridges and thousands of new homes 
in areas devastated by the tsunami in Tohoku was unspent.  More than ¥5.46 
trillion in aid to local governments also remained in banks, as did ¥251 billion for 
Ishinomaki, where 3700 people died.  Only 5 percent of homes have been rebuilt.  
And only 6% of municipal waste has been disposed of. 
 Eighty two percent of Japanese believe that the government could not help 
them in an emergency and 80 percent believe that the government has not told the 
truth.  Two thirds say that relief was too slow.  Sixty percent had little or no 
confidence in nuclear power plants.  One survey found that trust in government in 
Japan was at a similar level as in Russia (Economist, 2012).  Americans after 
Katrina were less critical of their government. 
 The government’s poor record in rebuilding is responsible for declining trust. 
But so are the close ties between the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) that 
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built and ran the reactors and the government.  TEPCO falsified a 2002 report on 
safety tests and ignored early warnings that the plants could not withstand 
earthquakes.  The Prime Minister hid a report about the possible evacuation of 
Tokyo.  People saw this relationship as cozy and corrupt.  When people see 
government as corrupt, it is not surprising that they have little confidence in the 
state.  Local government officials did not have such close ties to the nuclear power 
industry.   
 Nor was there evidence that they hid crucial information from the public. So 
trust in local governments did not decline.  In Japan, as in many other countries, 
people have more faith in local government than in the national government 
(Uslaner, 2001).  They are closer to the local government and their evaluations are 
at least partially based upon the superior performance of local governments in 
emergencies.  Skidmore and Toya (2013) found that countries with more 
decentralized governments have fewer disaster-induced fatalities. . The Great East 
Japan earthquake revealed that the inherited three layer model of center to 
prefecture to municipality did not operate. Localities had to organize to help each 
other 7 . The Great East Japan earthquake rekindled the debate over local 
government reform such as decentralization, local autonomy and regionalization 
(Samuels 2013, 177).  
 We have also shown that trust in government fell from the early years of the 
                                                 
7 The local government of Fukushima could not receive the information about the nuclear 
accident from the national government. Malfunction of According to lack of the information 
about the accident, the local government in damaged area could not decide action in response to 
the accident (Tauchi 2015, 91). 
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21st century to 2012—a year after the disaster.  For most other East Asian countries, 
trust either stayed the same or increased.  Only in Hong Kong did trust decline and 
not nearly as strongly as in Japan.  The nuclear disaster clearly led to a decline in 
trust in Japan and the failure of the government to resolve the crisis in the daily 
lives of people has kept confidence in leaders low. 
 Natural disasters provide stern tests for people's confidence in their political 
institutions.  For people to have confidence in their leaders, the leaders must show 
that they are in charge and understand people's problems of rebuilding their lives.   
In 2010 wildfires destroyed more than 500,000 hectacres in Russia, the most ever.  
Even as half of the Russian population blamed government, they gave high marks 
to the relief effort.  The federal government rebuilt homes for all villagers in a short 
period of time, regardless of the value of their own homes.  Prime Minister Putin 
visited two villages.  His own popularity stayed high and trust in government 
increased substantially in the affected areas (Lazarev et al, 2014.). 
 In Japan, national leaders were slow to respond—and were seen as complicit 
in making problems worse through their close ties to the nuclear industry.  This led 
to charges of corruption—so poor performance together with perceptions of 
complicity with the nuclear industry led to sharp declines in political trust.  The 
one governmental institution that did help with the recovery—and that was not 
complicit in making the problem worse (through ties to the nuclear industry) was 
local government. 
 Disasters do not always lead to a loss of confidence in government.  When 
governmental institutions are seen as engaged and helpful, as in the Russian 
wildfires, confidence may even increase.  But this is not the norm. The Japanese 
national government's weak response to the Great Earthquake is more typical—and 
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people's faith in their leaders seem destined to decline. 
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Table 1.  Composition of sample 
 
Country The second wave (2006-2008): 
Before the disaster. 
 The third wave (2011-2012): 
After the disaster. 
 The second and third wave 
Japan     683      1,367    2,050 
Hong Kong     623        884    1,507 
Mainland China     494      2,041    2,535 
Korea     992      1,038    2,030 
Malaysia    1,046      1,091    2,137 
Cambodia     823      1,069    1,892 
Indonesia    1,427      1,310    1,892 
Total    6,088      8,800   14,888 
Note:  The sample was used for the estimation when trust toward national government is dependent variable.  Total sample size varied 
between 9,828 and 12,363 and according to specifications because data for dependent variables cannot be obtained for some observations. 
Questionnaire for Mainland China did not include the question about the degree of trust toward the prime minister. The sample size is 
9,828 when trust toward president (or prime minister) is dependent variable. Sample size is almost 12,000 when other variables are 
dependent variable. 
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Table 2.  Definition of key variables and its basic statistics 
 Definition   Mean 
 Standard 
deviation 
Trust National 
Government 
The degree of trust in the national government: 
1 (None at all) - 4 (A Great Deal of Trust) 
2.70  0.88 
Trust Prime 
Minister 
The degree of trust in  Prime Minister or president: 
1 (None at all) - 4 (A Great Deal of Trust) 
    2.68     0.85 
Trust  Political 
Party 
The degree of trust in Political parties: 
1 (None at all) - 4 (A Great Deal of Trust) 
    2.50    0.94 
Trust Parliament 
The degree of trust in the parliament: 
1 (None at all) - 4 (A Great Deal of Trust)  
   2.59     0.92 
Trust Local 
Government 
The degree of trust in the local government: 
1 (None at all) - 4 (A Great Deal of Trust)  
  2.74     0.77 
Damaged dummy It takes 1 if the respondent lived in Japan (the damaged country), otherwise 0. 0.13 0.34 
Post Disaster 
dummy 
It takes 1 if the survey has been conducted after the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
otherwise 0. 
   0.58    0.49 
Age Ages    44.7     15.8 
Male It takes 1 if the respondent is male, otherwise 0.    0.50     0.50 
Urban dummy It takes 1 if the respondent lived in the urban area, otherwise 0.    0.58     0.49 
Bottom income 
It takes 1 if respondent’s monthly household income belonged to the lowest quantile, , 
otherwise 0. 
0.23 0.42 
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Low Income 
It takes 1 if respondent’s monthly household income belonged to the 2nd 
quantile, otherwise 0. 
0.24 0.43 
Middle Income 
It takes 1 if respondent’s monthly household income belonged to the 3nd quantile, 
otherwise 0. 
0.22 0.41 
High Income 
It takes 1 if respondent’s monthly household income belonged to the 4th quantile, 
otherwise 0. 
0.18 0.38 
Top Income 
It takes 1 if respondent’s monthly household income belonged to the top quantile, 
otherwise 0. 
0.13 0.33 
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Table 3.  Difference of mean value of trust between before and after the disaster. 
              (Value in the after the disaster – that in before the disaster) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trust National 
Government 
Trust National 
Prime Minister 
Trust  Political 
Party 
Trust Parliament 
Trust Local 
Government 
Japan – 0.22 – 0.14 – 0.15 – 0.11 0.08 
Hong Kong – 0.14 – 0.07 0.05 – 0.13 – 0.01 
Mainland 0.03 . 0.12 0.08 0.34 
Korea 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.03 0.08 
Malaysia 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.08 0.12 
Cambodia 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.08 
Indonesia – 0.12 – 0.05 –0.01 – 0.11 – 0.04 
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Table 4.  Regression results of DID method based on OLS estimation (Full sample) 
 
     (1) 
Trust National 
Government 
        (2) 
Trust Prime 
Minister 
  (3) 
Trust Political 
Party 
    (4) 
Trust  Parliament 
     (5) 
Trust Local 
Government 
Damaged dummy    
Post Disaster dummy 
– 0.23*** 
(–7.55) 
– 0.22*** 
(–6.88) 
– 0.19*** 
(–6.00) 
– 0.09*** 
(–3.07) 
 0.02 
(0.76) 
Damaged dummy   – 0.82*** 
(–26.7) 
  – 0.86*** 
(–26.9) 
  – 0.61*** 
(–18.9) 
  – 0.82*** 
(–25.6) 
  – 0.39*** 
(–12.6) 
Post Disaster dummy     0.02 
    (1.09) 
    0.07*** 
    (5.20) 
    0.04*** 
    (3.36) 
    0.0001 
    (0.01) 
    0.07*** 
    (5.50) 
Age 
    0.002*** 
    (4.97) 
  0.002*** 
    (3.94) 
  0.002*** 
    (5.38) 
    0.001 
    (1.14) 
    0.001 
    (1.41) 
Male 
– 0.02** 
(–2.23) 
– 0.04*** 
(–3.31) 
– 0.02* 
(–1.90) 
– 0.02** 
(–2.16) 
– 0.05*** 
(–4.80) 
Urban dummy 
 
– 0.10*** 
(–7.43) 
– 0.08*** 
(–4.91) 
– 0.07*** 
(–4.85) 
– 0.10*** 
(–7.03) 
– 0.08*** 
(–5.86) 
Bottom income  <reference group>  
Low Income 
– 0.05*** 
(–3.20) 
– 0.03* 
(–1.80) 
– 0.05*** 
(–3.15) 
– 0.06*** 
(–3.42) 
– 0.06*** 
(–3.73) 
Middle Income 
– 0.06*** 
(–3.71) 
– 0.05** 
(–2.53) 
– 0.07*** 
(–3.98) 
– 0.08*** 
(–4.67) 
– 0.08*** 
(–4.49) 
High Income 
– 0.09*** 
(–4.54) 
– 0.09*** 
(–4.25) 
– 0.10*** 
(–5.09) 
– 0.10*** 
(–5.20) 
– 0.07*** 
(–3.86) 
Top Income 
– 0.09*** 
(–4.33) 
– 0.08*** 
(–3.05) 
– 0.14*** 
(–6.13) 
– 0.12*** 
(–5.74) 
– 0.06*** 
(–2.87) 
Constant 
   3.05*** 
    (68.9) 
   3.11*** 
    (67.2) 
   2.74*** 
    (56.2) 
   3.30*** 
    (65.7) 
   3.06*** 
    (69.6) 
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 Note:  Dummies for Education level, dummies for marital status and Country dummies are include, but its results are not reported. 
Values in parentheses are t-values calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** exhibit the statistical significance at the 10%, 
5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R-square    0.38    0.26    0.39    0.42    0.16 
Observations   14,888   12,648   14,759   14,695   15,171 
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Table 5.  Regression results of DID method based on OLS estimation (Sub-sample excluding Indonesia) 
 Note:  Dummies for Education level, dummies for marital status and Country dummies are include, but its results are not reported. 
Values in parentheses are t-values calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** exhibit the statistical significance at the 10%, 
5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (1) 
Trust National 
Government 
        (2) 
Trust Prime 
Minister 
  (3) 
Trust Political 
Party 
    (4) 
Trust  Parliament 
     (5) 
Trust Local 
Government 
Damaged dummy    
Post Disaster dummy 
– 0.28*** 
(–8.94) 
– 0.28*** 
(–8.42) 
– 0.21*** 
(–6.64) 
– 0.14*** 
(–4.53) 
– 0.01 
(–0.45) 
Damaged dummy   – 0.80*** 
(–25.1) 
  – 0.82*** 
(–24.6) 
  – 0.62*** 
(–18.8) 
  – 0.83*** 
(–25.3) 
  – 0.37*** 
(–11.7) 
Post Disaster dummy     0.06*** 
    (4.08) 
    0.14*** 
    (7.61) 
    0.07*** 
    (4.63) 
    0.04*** 
    (3.10) 
    0.11*** 
    (7.28) 
R-square    0.42    0.30    0.45    0.48    0.18 
Observations   12,151   9,828   12,060   11,900   12,363 
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Table 6.  Regression results of DID method based on OLS estimation (Sub-sample of Japan and Hong Kong). 
  
Note:  The set of independent variables are equivalent to that in Table 4, but its results are not reported. Values in parentheses are t-values 
calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** exhibit the statistical significance at the 10%, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (1) 
Trust National 
Government 
        (2) 
Trust Prime 
Minister 
  (3) 
Trust Political 
Party 
    (4) 
Trust  Parliament 
     (5) 
Trust Local 
Government 
Damaged dummy    
Post Disaster dummy 
– 0.09* 
(–1.87) 
– 0.09* 
(–1.99) 
– 0.22*** 
(–4.43) 
– 0.009 
(–0.18) 
 0.06 
(1.27) 
Damaged dummy   – 0.73*** 
(–20.5) 
  – 0.63*** 
(–18.7) 
  – 0.34*** 
(–8.93) 
  – 0.70*** 
(–18.7) 
  – 0.40*** 
(–11.3) 
Post Disaster dummy     –0.14*** 
    (–3.32) 
    –0.07* 
    (–1.73) 
    0.07* 
    (1.80) 
  – 0.10*** 
    (–2.66) 
    0.01 
    (0.45) 
R-square    0.29    0.23    0.15    0.24    0.08 
Observations   3,557   3,650   3,462   3,530   3,662 
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Table 7.  Regression results of DID method based on OLS estimation (Sub-sample of Japan and Indonesia). 
  
Note:  The set of independent variables are equivalent to that in Table 4, but its results are not reported. Values in parentheses are t-values 
calculated based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** exhibit the statistical significance at the 10%, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively.  
 
     (1) 
Trust National 
Government 
        (2) 
Trust Prime 
Minister 
  (3) 
Trust Political 
Party 
    (4) 
Trust  Parliament 
     (5) 
Trust Local 
Government 
Damaged dummy    
Post Disaster dummy 
– 0.07* 
(–1.89) 
– 0.07* 
(–1.93) 
– 0.11*** 
(–2.61) 
0.04 
(1.04) 
 0.15*** 
(3.92) 
Damaged dummy   – 0.55*** 
(–16.0) 
  – 0.66*** 
(–19.5) 
  – 0.27*** 
(–7.17) 
  – 0.45*** 
(–11.9) 
  – 0.34*** 
(–9.47) 
Post Disaster dummy     –0.14*** 
    (–5.26) 
    –0.06*** 
    (–2.75) 
    – 0.03 
    (– 1.14) 
  – 0.14*** 
    (–5.00) 
   – 0.05** 
    ( –2.27) 
R-square    0.23    0.24    0.12    0.18    0.06 
Observations   4,787   4,946   4,788   4,866   4,917 
